PropAMMs senken die Solana-Handelskosten und die Erträge öffentlicher Pools sinken
Story summary
In einem Preprint vom September wurde festgestellt, dass die SOL/USDC-Ausführung auf dem ruhigen Markt bei professionellen Pools günstiger ist, während passive Einlegerrenditen eine separate Abrechnung erfordern. Der Beitrag „PropAMMs senkte die Solana-Handelskosten und der Absturz der Rendite öffentlicher Pools“ erschien zuerst auf CryptoSlate.
📌 Key Highlights & Takeaways
- In einem Preprint vom September wurde festgestellt, dass die SOL/USDC-Ausführung auf dem ruhigen Markt bei professionellen Pools günstiger ist, während passive Einlegerrenditen eine separate Abrechnung erfordern.
- Der Beitrag „PropAMMs senkte die Solana-Handelskosten und der Absturz der Rendite öffentlicher Pools“ erschien zuerst auf CryptoSlate.
A trader can get a better Solana (SOL) swap price while a passive pool depositor remains exposed to traders picking off stale quotes, and a Sept. 29 preprint measures that divide.
For quiet-market SOL/USDC fills, propAMMs, pools controlled by professional operators, had a reference-relative execution cost proxy of 0.26 basis points versus 2.59 for public automated market makers (AMMs).
The study covers Sept. 1, 2025, through Aug. 31, 2026, with shorter Base and Monad samples. It weights fills by notional against Bybit's size-weighted top-of-book USDT microprice, converted with its USDC/USDT midpoint. Its authors list ETH Zurich and Category Labs affiliations.
A swapper wants more tokens for the same input, while a depositor supplies the inventory others trade against and needs compensation for the risks that inventory carries. Low execution cost can attract the first participant without being a sufficient investment case for the second.
Across its Solana sample , the paper reports two-second gross maker markouts of +0.37 basis points for propAMMs and −0.22 for public AMMs. A markout compares a fill with a later reference price, and a positive number favors the maker.
Quiet-flow execution asks how much a trader gives up against a relatively stable reference. The proxy requires less than 1 basis point of reference movement from five seconds before to one second after a fill.
Maker markouts ask what happens to a trade's value after the pool accepts it. Mixing the measures would turn evidence about pricing and adverse selection into a profitability claim the numbers cannot support.
When an outside market moves first, a pool still offering an old price can sell too cheaply or buy too dearly. An arbitrageur brings the prices back into line, but the correction comes through a trade against the liquidity already sitting in the pool.
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Source: CryptoSlate.
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